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COMMENT 
 
International Adoption:  
Improving on the 1993 Hague Convention  
 
JENNIFER A. RATCLIFF
†
 
_______________________ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention or 
Convention) addresses the need to protect internationally adopted 
children and promote global recognition of international adoptions.1 
The Convention acts as a guide to states for building a legal structure 
to govern such adoptions2 with the ultimate goal of promoting the 
creation of legal systems that end practices such as child selling and 
child sex trafficking.3 While emphasizing the importance of safety in 
 
 This comment was originally published in volume 23, number 1 of the 
International Law Practicum (Spring 2010), a publication of the International Law 
and Practice Section of the New York State Bar Association. 
† Managing Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2009–10; J.D., 
University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010. The author wishes to thank 
Professors Peter Danchin and Michael Van Alstine for their guidance and direction; 
Peter Heinlein for his hard work and helpful input during the revision process of 
this Comment; and, most especially, her parents and sister.  
1. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th 
Session, Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134–46 (1993) 
[hereinafter Hague Adoption Convention]. 
2. Id. 
3. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1139 (―The States signatory to 
the present Convention [are] . . . convinced of the necessity to take measures to 
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international adoption, the Convention also makes clear that states’ 
first priority should be keeping children within their own families or 
at least placing them with families in their country of origin; 
international adoption should be used only as a last resort.4 These 
goals are a step toward protecting the rights of internationally 
adopted children, but the Convention itself does little to ensure that 
they can be successfully implemented in the real world.5 Since the 
drafting of the Convention, serious problems have become apparent. 
Many individual countries lack the resources and strong 
governmental support needed to create and maintain a Central 
Authority on adoption.6 Also, the language of the Convention is 
vague, subject to broad interpretation,7 and devoid of sanctions for 
countries that violate its mandates.8 These problems leave room for 
individual states to enact policies that do not support an adoption 
program that prioritizes the Convention’s main goal: placing children 
with families within their own countries before looking to 
international adoption.9 Nowhere is this clearer than in China, where 
parents are restricted to one child and often have no choice but to 
give up any additional children.10 The only chance these abandoned 
babies have to grow up outside an orphanage is to be adopted by a 
foreign family,11 an endeavor made more difficult with the passage of 
a new law severely restricting who is allowed to adopt Chinese 
children.12 By examining these Chinese policies in further detail, one 
can see more plainly that governments can, and do, pass laws in 
direct opposition to the Convention’s goal of minimizing the 
institutionalization of children.13 
 
ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the best interests of the child and 
with respect for his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale 
of, or traffic in children.‖). 
4. Id. (―The States signatory to the present Convention . . . [recall] that each 
State should take, as a matter of priority, appropriate measures to enable the child 
to remain in the care of his or her family of origin . . . [and recognize] that 
intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for 
whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.‖) 
5. See infra Part IV. 
6. See infra Part IV.A. 
7. See infra Part IV.B. 
8. See infra Part IV.C. 
9. See infra Part V. 
10. See infra Part V.A. 
11. See infra Part V.A. 
12. See infra Part V.B. 
13. See infra Part V. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION 
International adoption began in the middle of the twentieth 
century, following the end of World War II, when American soldiers 
arrived back home and shed light on the problem of children 
displaced by the war.14 In the Declaration on Social and Legal 
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with 
Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,15 the United 
Nations (UN) drew attention to the need that arises for adoptive 
homes following calamities. The UN General Assembly expressed 
concern with ―the large number of children who are abandoned or 
become orphans owing to violence, internal disturbance, armed 
conflicts, natural disasters, economic crises or social problems.‖16 
During the 1950s, proxy adoptions, which allowed U.S. citizens to 
adopt by designating a proxy agent to take their place in foreign 
courts, were the most widely publicized means of international 
adoption.17 Since that time, international adoptions have become 
increasingly popular, particularly among Americans.18 There were 
about 15,000 foreign children adopted by U.S. families between 1953 
and 1962,19 compared with 17,495 in 2008 alone.20   
While international adoption was once generally motivated by the 
aftermath of wars, it is now much more a product of the gap between 
the world’s poor and privileged populations.21 Receiving countries 
 
14. Ellen Herman, International Adoptions, The Adoption History Project, July 
11, 2007, http://www.uoregon.edu/~adoption/topics/internationaladoption.htm 
[hereinafter The Adoption History Project: International Adoptions]. 
15. G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986).  
16. Id. annex. 
17. Ellen Herman, Proxy Adoptions, The Adoption History Project, July 11, 
2007, http://www.uoregon.edu/~adoption/topics/proxy.htm. This practice gained 
traction after 1955 when Harry and Bertha Holt, an evangelical couple from 
Oregon, adopted eight Korean War orphans. Id. The Holts went on to arrange many 
similar adoptions for other American families. The Adoption History Project: 
International Adoptions, supra note 14. 
18. Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption, Infertility, and the New 
World of Child Protection 143 (Beacon Press ed., 1999) (1993).  
19. The Adoption History Project: International Adoptions, supra note 14. 
20. The United States Department of State, Office of Children’s Issues, 
Intercountry Adoption: Total Adoptions to the United States, http://adoption.state. 
gov/news/total_chart.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Chart: Total 
Adoptions to the United States (by country)]. This number includes 4,123 children 
from Guatemala, 3,909 from mainland China, 1,861 from Russia, 1,725 from 
Ethiopia and 1,065 from South Korea. Id. 
21. BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 141–43. 
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have low birthrates and few children in need of homes; conversely, 
sending countries have high birthrates and many homeless children.22 
In industrialized receiving countries the demand for foreign children 
has risen as the availability of children to adopt domestically has 
dropped.23 This decrease is due to various factors that have emerged 
in recent decades, such as the use of contraception, the legalization of 
abortion, and the increased acceptance of single parents.24 On the 
other hand, the practice of giving up children to international parents 
is common in countries where both families and government itself 
cannot care for the abandoned or orphaned children.25 For families, 
the reasons could be as basic as the economic inability to afford a 
child; however, there may be more complex social and political 
factors at play. Poignant examples include Confucian beliefs in Korea 
that promote continuing the family through an unbroken bloodline 
(this stopped many Koreans from adopting displaced children 
following the Korean War);26 the Ceausescu regime in Romania, 
which forced women to have at least four children for the state;27 and 
the one-child policy in China, which leads many families to give up 
or even abort ―extra‖ children.28 For some governments, the 
incapacity to care for their children could be the temporary result of a 
war or an economic downturn.29 For others, the problem might be 
more permanent,30 as is the case in economically underdeveloped 
countries that experience a combination of population explosion and 
 
22. Id. at 141. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. 
25. MARY KATHLEEN BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION 121 (1976). 
26. Sam Jameson, Keeping Them Home, Orphan–A Shame Fades in South 
Korea, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1989, at A1. 
27. Jini L. Roby, Understanding Sending Country’s Traditions and Policies in 
International Adoptions: Avoiding Legal and Cultural Pitfalls, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
303, 314 (2004). As many as 140,000 children were institutionalized as a result of 
this policy; all because Ceausescu saw children as a symbol of national pride and 
power. Id. In furtherance of this policy Ceausescu outlawed birth control and 
abortion. Catharine Dunphy, The Romania Adoptions: New Lives for the Children 
of Turmoil, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 22, 1993, at B1. Impoverished Romanian 
families often could not support so many children and had no choice but to give 
them up. Id.  
28. Alexa Olesen, China Sticking to One-Child Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 
2007 (noting that many couples give up or abort female babies so they can have the 
opportunity to try for a son). 
29. BENET, supra note 25, at 121–22. 
30. Id. at 121. 
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depression.31 For the families and countries faced with these harsh 
realities, international adoption might be the only solution.32  
III. THE 1993 HAGUE CONVENTION  
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
Operation of Respect of Intercountry Adoption was adopted on May 
29, 199333 and applies to all international adoptions between member 
states.34 As of February 2010, eighty-one countries have ratified the 
Convention and an additional three, Ireland, Nepal, and the Russian 
Federation, are signatories but are not party to the treaty.35 
The Convention’s main success was its ability to bring together 
such a large number of interested parties, both to acknowledge the 
need for, and to commit to working towards, international adoption 
regulations.36 Previous UN declarations and conventions have 
touched on international adoption, such as the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child;37 the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles 
Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special 
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption;38 and the Convention 
 
31. Id. at 122. 
32. Id. at 121–22. 
33. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1134. 
34. Id. 
35. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table, 33: 
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect 
of Intercountry Adoption, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions. 
status&cid=69 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). See generally United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Treaty Reference Guide: Definitions, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Over 
view.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) 
[hereinafter Treaty Reference Guide] (describing the difference between 
―signatories‖ to a treaty and ―parties‖ to a treaty which are ―[s]tates and other 
entities with treaty-making capacity which have expressed their consent to be 
bound by a treaty and where the treaty is in force for such States and entities‖). 
36. See BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 150. 
37. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), princ. 6, U.N. 
Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959) (―The child, for the full and harmonious development 
of his personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow 
up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, in any case, in an 
atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years 
shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society 
and the public authorities shall have the duty to extend particular care to children 
without a family and to those without adequate means of support. Payment of State 
and other assistance towards the maintenance of children of large families is 
desirable.‖).  
38. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to Adoption and Foster 
Placement of Children Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, art. 17, 
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on the Rights of the Child;39 but the 1993 Convention is noticeably 
different.40 First, it focuses solely on international adoption.41 Second, 
nearly all countries that engage in international adoption played a role 
in drafting and approving it.42 Finally, it shows a different attitude 
towards the idea of a child’s being adopted outside of his or her 
native country. The Convention represents a ―far more enthusiastic 
 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986) (acknowledging international adoption as 
an option for abandoned children, but only as a last resort: ―If a child cannot be 
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared 
for in the country of origin, intercountry adoption may be considered as an 
alternative means of providing the child with a family.‖). 
39. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 20, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989): 
1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in 
that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance 
provided by the State. 2. States Parties shall in accordance with their 
national laws ensure alternative care for such a child. 3. Such care could 
include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if 
necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When 
considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of 
continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, 
cultural and linguistic background. 
See also id. art. 21: 
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall 
ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration and they shall: (a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is 
authorized only by competent authorities who determine, in accordance 
with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and 
reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child’s 
status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if 
required, the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the 
adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary; (b) 
Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative 
means of child’s care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an 
adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s 
country of origin; (c) Ensure that the child concerned by inter-country 
adoption enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing in the 
case of national adoption; (d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, 
in inter-country adoption, the placement does not result in improper 
financial gain for those involved in it; (e) Promote, where appropriate, the 
objectives of the present article by concluding bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within this framework, to 
ensure that the placement of the child in another country is carried out by 
competent authorities or organs. 
40. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and 
Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 181, 192 (1996). 
41. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1. 
42. Bartholet, supra note 40, at 192. 
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endorsement of international adoption as a good solution for children 
without parents than any previous international agreement.‖43 It shifts 
the focus from keeping children within their country of origin at all 
cost, to finding abandoned or orphaned children a permanent family, 
wherever that family may reside.44 The Preamble states that 
international adoption may be the best option for a child ―for whom a 
suitable family cannot be found in his or her [s]tate of origin.‖45 This 
change in tone establishes international adoption as a preferable 
alternative to several worst case scenarios, such as institutionalization 
and homelessness, while still urging countries to take ―appropriate 
measures to enable the child to remain in the care of his or her 
family‖46 or, if this is not possible, to make efforts to find the child a 
family within his or her own country of origin.47 Despite a hierarchy 
that placed international adoption near the bottom, the Convention 
sought to create, at a minimum, a foundation for cooperative 
international adoption law.48 
The Convention has three main objectives: to ensure international 
adoptions take place in the best interests of the child, to establish 
cooperation among countries so as to ensure safeguards are put in 
place to prevent the exploitation of children, and to promote 
recognition of adoptions that conform to the Convention’s 
standards.49 The Convention first sets out the requirements for 
international adoptions.50 The state of origin must establish that: the 
child is adoptable, international adoption is in the child’s best 
interest, and the child’s parents (or the institution where the child 
resides) have consented to the adoption.51 Additionally, the 
Convention places a duty on the receiving state to determine that: the 
prospective parents are eligible and suitable, they be counseled if 
necessary, and the child is, or will be, allowed to enter the country 
and permanently reside there.52 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1134–35. 
46. Id. at 1139. 
47. Id. 
48. BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 150. 
49. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1139.  
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 1139–40. 
52. Id. at 1140. 
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Chapter III of the Convention requires contracting states53 to 
―designate a Central Authority54 to discharge the duties which are 
imposed by the Convention upon such authorities.‖55 Among other 
things, Central Authorities are required to work cooperatively with 
one another, to prevent any gain, financial or otherwise, in 
connection with adoption and to fulfill the requirements listed above 
as either a state of origin or a receiving state.56 Chapter IV lists more 
specific procedures that the Central Authority must follow with 
respect to individual adoptions.57 The Central Authority of the 
receiving state must conduct an investigation and compile a report on 
the potential adoptive parent or parents.58 If it concludes that this 
person or couple is suitable, it will transmit the report to the Central 
Authority of the desired country of origin, which then evaluates the 
report and makes a determination on the prospective parent or 
parents.59 If the country of origin’s Central Authority is satisfied, it 
will transmit information about the prospective adopted child to the 
new family.60 Finally, both Authorities must ensure that the child will 
be able to leave his or her country of origin and enter the receiving 
country.61 Thus, the Convention not only consolidates authority and 
streamlines adoption practices in member states, but also creates a 
 
53. The UN defines contracting states as ―States and other entities with treaty-
making capacity which have expressed their consent to be bound by a treaty where 
the treaty has not yet entered into force or where it has not entered into force for 
such States and entities.‖ Treaty Reference Guide, supra note 35. Once the treaty 
has entered into force for the state or entity it becomes a ―party‖ to the treaty. Id.  
54. The Central Authority is described as follows: 
The Central Authority is the governmental body that is responsible for 
implementing the Convention. It may delegate many of its duties to other 
authorities, as provided for by the convention. For the U.S., the Department 
of State will provide the Central Authority, to be located in the Office of 
Children’s Issues. The U.S. Central Authority is expected to delegate many 
of its responsibilities concerning specific adoption cases to accredited 
bodies or approved persons (for example, preparing home studies, 
educating parents, and referring specific children for adoption). 
Holt International, Hague Convention Definitions, http://www.holtintl.org/hague/ 
HagueConvDef.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).  
55. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1140. 
56. Id. at 1140–41. 
57. Id. at 1141–42. 
58. Id. at 1141. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id.  
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process of cooperation between the two concerned countries.62   
Chapter V of the Convention concerns the recognition and effects 
of the adoption.63 Among other things, it mandates that an adoption 
may only be refused if it ―is manifestly contrary to [the state’s] public 
policy.‖64 Chapter V also asserts the Convention’s recognition of the 
legal relationship between a child and his or her adoptive parents and 
the termination of this relationship, upon the finalization of the 
adoption, between the child and his or her birth parents.65 Chapter VI 
lists general provisions.66 Perhaps most notably, it states that ―[n]o 
one shall derive improper financial or other gain from an activity 
related to an intercountry adoption‖ and limits any fees to ―costs and 
expenses.‖67 
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTION  
The Hague Convention was the first declaration of its kind to 
acknowledge the reality that international adoption is sometimes a 
positive solution for abandoned and orphaned children.68 In bringing 
so many nations together to address this singular issue, the 
Convention also brought international attention to both the virtues of 
the system and the problems it still faces. Despite these 
achievements, however, the Convention is deficient in several areas, 
and it has left holes in the international adoption system that have 
permitted further abuses.  
A. Many Countries Lack the Resources or Governmental 
Support Necessary for Creating and Maintaining a Central 
Authority 
The Convention’s requirement for a Central Authority in each 
contracting state was designed to ensure that each country that 
participated in international adoption had a medium through which 
the UN’s adoption standards could be promoted and enforced.69 This 
idea is sound in theory, but in practice it has proven unrealistic.70 
 
62. See supra Part III. 
63. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1142. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 1143–44. 
67. Id. at 1143. 
68. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.  
69. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1140. 
70. See supra Part IV.A. 
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Such an endeavor requires funding and a revamping of the adoption 
systems of most countries, a goal which may be impossible for 
underdeveloped nations to achieve.  
In Romania, one of the first countries to ratify the Convention, the 
failure to fix the severely crippled adoption system has effectively led 
to the end of all international adoptions of Romanian children.71 In 
1997, prospective adoptive parents began to complain that the system 
had become too slow and overly bureaucratic;72 unfortunately, when 
Romania attempted to simplify and improve it, the results were 
disastrous. The newly implemented laws opened the door to 
corruption that the government was not equipped to address.73 When 
Romania applied for membership to the European Union (EU), the 
EU demanded that it overhaul its entire adoption system as a 
prerequisite for joining.74 In an attempt to reevaluate and reform the 
system, Romania issued, in June 2001, a ―temporary‖ moratorium on 
all international adoptions.75 The U.S. agreed with this decision at the 
time and acknowledged that Romania’s legal framework had not 
always protected the best interest of the child.76 The U.S. made 
recommendations on how Romania’s adoption procedures could be 
improved and reiterated that the child’s interest is paramount.77 
Within a month of the moratorium, Romania passed a law that 
banned international adoption of Romanian children by anyone other 
than grandparents.78 Political changes, political opposition, 
uncertainty regarding international adoptions, and a lack of finances 
 
71. Maura Harty, Assistant Sec’y of State for Consular Affairs, Testimony to the 
Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur. (Sept. 14, 2005) (discussing how 
Romania’s adoption laws failed to protect their children and how this led to their 
moratorium on international adoption), available at http://www.passportsusa.com/ 
law/legal/testimony/testimony_2635.html. 
72. Molly S. Marx, Whose Best Interests Does it Really Serve? A Critical 
Examination of Romania’s Recent Self-Serving International Adoption Policies, 21 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 373, 383 (2007).  
73. Id. at 384.  
74. Id. at 386–87. 
75. On the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of the Child, Law No. 
272/2004, Rom. O.G. (2004). For a summary of this law in English, see The 
Library of Congress Global Legal Information Network, http://content.glin.gov/su 
mmary/140306 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). 
76. Harty, supra note 71. 
77. Id. 
78. On Legal Status of Adoption, Law No. 273/2004, Rom O.G. (2004). For a 
summary of this law in English, see The Library of Congress Global Legal 
Information Network, http://content.glin.gov/summary/118895 (last visited Apr. 
18, 2010). 
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kept Romania from reforming the system to bring it in line with the 
Convention;79 and, as a result, both laws remain in force to this day. 
This policy has left more than 80,000 Romanian children to live in 
orphanages or foster care without a permanent family.80   
The situation is perhaps even worse in Cambodia, where the 
government’s inability to effectively regulate has lead to the adoption 
of countless kidnapped or purchased children for profit.81 Despite 
being aware of rampant fraud within the system, the Cambodian 
government was not able to create a way to successfully evaluate visa 
applications on behalf of orphans.82 The child trafficking problem in 
Cambodia, which was most prevalent between 1997 and 2001,83 is 
―the most documented instance of large-scale child laundering within 
the intercountry adoption system.‖84 In fact, it is likely that most of 
the 1,609 Cambodian children that were adopted in the U.S. during 
that time were laundered.85 As a result, on December 21, 2001,86 the 
U.S. government suspended all adoptions from Cambodia.87   
The Convention’s Central Authority requirement is instrumental to 
setting and maintaining standards for international adoption in each 
 
79. H.R. Res. 578, 109th Cong. (2005).  
80. UNICEF, Romania: Background, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/roma 
nia_background.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). 
81. David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System 
Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping and 
Stealing Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 145 (2006). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 144–45. 
84. Id. at 135. See Ethica, Cambodian Adoption Investigation/Prosecution 
Documents, http://www.ethicanet.org/item.php?recordid=camdocs&pagestyle=def 
ault (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (showing many of the relevant U.S. government 
documents concerning criminal prosecutions in the Cambodian adoption laundering 
scandal). 
85. Id. at 137. 
86. The U.S. government suspended all adoption of Cambodian children on 
December 21, 2001. However, at that time, there were a number of adoptions 
already underway and at various stages of the process. These ―pipeline‖ cases 
continued to be evaluated and, if appropriate, were approved. As a result, there is 
data available on Cambodian adoptions to the U.S. as late as 2003. Trish Maskew, 
Child Trafficking and Intercountry Adoption: The Cambodian Experience, 35 
CUMB. L. REV. 619, 621–25 (2005).  
87. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 
INS Announces Suspension of Cambodian Adoptions and Offer of Parole in 
Certain Pending Cases (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pres 
srelease/CambAdop_122101.pdf. 
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contracting state.88 While the theory behind this mandate makes 
sense, in practice it is clear that the Convention’s demand for 
adoption system reform does not automatically make such reform 
happen. Both the Romanian and Cambodian governments have 
proven unable or unwilling to carry out reforms they agreed to when 
they signed on to the treaty, leaving tens of thousands of children 
institutionalized following the passage of laws that ended their 
chances of adoption. These laws prove that the systems at issue are 
deeply flawed, and major improvements must be made to bring them 
in line with the Convention. The Convention, however, provides no 
support to help these countries achieve those improvements.89 
B. The Convention Is Vague and Subject to Broad Interpretation 
While the Convention clearly describes the duties of the Central 
Authority,90 many other aspects of the Convention are not so 
straightforward. Much of the ambiguity has to do with the definition 
of certain words.91 For instance, while the Convention explicitly 
states that it is up to the Central Authority in the country of origin to 
determine if the child in question is ―adoptable,‖92 it gives no 
indication as to what that means.93 It does not even list minimum 
requirements for finding a child adoptable.94 In many countries the 
system is burdened by practices such as forcing a parent or guardian 
to surrender his or her legal rights to the child so others can sell the 
child to be adopted.95 The primary means by which launderers in 
Cambodia persuaded parents to give up their children were false 
statements such as: ―a rich family will raise your baby in the United 
States; . . . . [w]hen your child becomes an adult, he can petition for 
 
88. See supra Part III. 
89. See Smolin, supra note 81, at 145–47 (discussing the Cambodian 
government’s inability to screen out cases of purchased or stolen children). See 
generally Harty, supra note 71 (discussing the problems within the Romanian 
adoption system and how the government could not cope with them). 
90. See supra Part III. 
91. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1. 
92. Id. at 1139 (―An adoption within the scope of the Convention should take 
palace only if the competent authorities of the State of origin . . . have established 
that the child is adoptable . . . .‖).  
93. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1. 
94. Id. 
95. Smolin, supra note 81, at 115–17 (discussing the practice of launderers who 
buy or steal children from their birth families; thus, blurring the line between ―true 
orphans‖ and ―paper orphans‖).  
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you to immigrate to the United States.‖96 Alternatively, and perhaps 
more cruelly, some parents were told that their child would be given 
a better life in Cambodia and that they could visit and/or take the 
child back at any time.97 The Convention does not mandate that 
countries look into the background of how a child came to be an 
orphan and, left unchecked, many governments might find such a 
laundered child to be ―adoptable‖ simply by virtue of the fact that he 
or she no longer has a legal guardian. By allowing such crucial terms 
to remain undefined and open to interpretation, the Convention runs 
the risk that some Central Authorities might be uncertain as to which 
children are appropriate candidates for adoption. 
C. The Convention Is Difficult to Enforce and Does Not Impose 
Sanctions  
While the Convention is the international community’s first 
attempt to set a standard that emphasizes the child’s interest within 
the international adoption system, it does little to ensure that 
contracting states adhere to that standard or other mandates.98 One 
reason for this problem is the Central Authority system itself. 
According to Article 6 of the Convention, the Central Authority is 
responsible for enforcing the Convention in each individual country, 
and the government is in charge of supervising the Central 
Authority.99 This practice allows each country to police its own 
international adoption system however it chooses, despite the 
Convention’s intention that every government should look first to its 
children’s best interests.100  
Not only are Central Authorities inadequately scrutinized, but there 
 
96. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, BACKGROUNDER: 
OPERATION BROKEN HEARTS (2004). 
97. Id. 
98. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1. 
99. Id. at 1140. Article 6 provides: 
(1) A Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority to discharge the 
duties which are imposed by the Convention upon such authorities.  
(2) Federal States, States with more than one system of law or States 
having autonomous territorial units shall be free to appoint more than one 
Central Authority and to specify the territorial or personal extent of their 
functions. Where a State has appointed more than one Central Authority, it 
shall designate the Central Authority to which any communication may be 
addressed for transmission to the appropriate Central Authority within that 
State.  
Id. 
100. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1. 
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are no sanctions contained in the Convention that can be used to 
punish a country that violates its requirements.101 Issuing 
moratoriums on adoptions from countries with systems that do not 
meet the Convention’s requirements is the only recourse that has 
been used.102 This ―solution‖ is ill-advised for three reasons. First, 
there is no broad authority that can end all adoptions from a particular 
country. Instead, either the country itself must decide that its system 
is so in need of reform that it cannot continue with international 
adoptions, or other individual countries must refuse to adopt from the 
deficient country. Second, the decision to end all adoptions often is 
not reached until the problem is out of hand, such as with the baby 
laundering epidemic in Cambodia.103 This is likely a direct result of 
allowing only self-regulation. Finally, ending international adoptions 
is not an ideal solution; while it may temporarily stop a corrupt 
system, it will lead many children to end up in institutions because 
sending countries generally have more children in need than they do 
domestic families willing to adopt.104 The focus must be on helping 
countries to reform rather than forcing them to shut down. The 
situation as it is will continue as long as there is no overarching 
authority to oversee the practices and procedures of individual 
Central Authorities.105 
V. STATE POLICIES INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONVENTION: FOCUS 
ON CHINA 
It is clear that the Convention is far from flawless.106 While the 
discussion thus far has focused on problems that arise because 
countries either will not or cannot reform their adoption systems to 
meet the standards of the Convention,107 there is an additional 
problem. Many complex issues arise as a result of state policies that 
directly contradict the Convention’s goals. Nowhere is this problem 
more evident than in China where the one-child policy and new 
 
101. Id. 
102. See supra Part IV.A. 
103. See supra Part IV.A. 
104. S. Res. 359, 109th Cong. (2006) (urging the government of Romania to 
reform their adoption system and resume international adoptions to ensure all 
Romanian children are raised in permanent families); Harty, supra note 71 
(discussing the need to urge the government of Romania to resume intercountry 
adoptions for the sake of Romanian children in need). 
105. See infra Part VI. 
106. See supra Part IV. 
107. See supra Part IV. 
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adoption requirements actually increase the number of children in 
need of a home while simultaneously preventing more children from 
being adopted.108 In doing so, China goes against the Convention’s 
prioritizing of adoption over institutionalization.109   
A. China’s One-Child Policy Is in Direct Tension with the 
Convention 
China enacted its famous one-child policy in 1980 to address the 
problem of overpopulation.110 The policy restricts families to having 
only one child unless their regional government permits them to have 
more.111 Even if such permission is granted, the couple will still be 
penalized.112 Penalties include the ―loss of state benefits, housing or 
employment,‖ which most poor families cannot afford.113 As a result, 
China has a notorious problem with abandoned and orphaned 
children. As of 2008, there were at least twenty million orphaned 
children living there.114 Since 1992, when China first began to allow 
 
108. See infra Part V.A–B. 
109. See infra Part V.A–B. 
110. The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the 
Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on April 10, 1980 and 
became effective on January 1, 1981. For the English text of the law, see 
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE 
NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF THE P.R.C., THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 184–86 (1987). Article 2 of the Marriage Law states in part: 
―Family planning shall be practised.‖ Id. Article 12 of the Marriage Law states: 
―Both husband and wife shall have the duty to practise family planning.‖ Id. 
111. CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL 
ADOPTIONS: A MENTAL HEALTH PROSPECTIVE 188–89 (1993). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. Aside from the problems the one-child policy causes the international 
adoption system, it has serious human rights implications as well. See Forced 
Abortion and Sterilization in China: The View From the Inside: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Int’l Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. On Int’l Rel., 
105th Cong. (1998) (discussing the Chinese government’s use of forced abortions 
and sterilizations to enforce their one-child policy); Olesen, supra note 28 (pointing 
out the huge disparity between boys and girls in China as a result of couples 
aborting or giving up female babies); see The Earthquake, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2008 (reporting that most parents who lost children in the devastating earthquake in 
May 2008 lost their only child because of the one-child policy). See generally Jim 
Yardley, China to Reconsider One-Child Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008 
(reporting that China is considering alternative ways to control their population in 
an attempt to soften their human rights image). 
114. NPR Weekend Edition Saturday: Considering China’s One-Child Policy 
(National Public Radio May 24, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=90801479. 
RATCLIFF MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:54 PM 
2010] IMPROVING ON THE 1993 HAGUE CONVENTION 351 
international adoption,115 it has become one of the world’s leading 
sources for internationally adopted children.116 
The one-child policy puts a strain on China’s adoption system by 
increasing the number of institutionalized children in three ways. The 
first is the most obvious: families are allowed only one child so that, 
unless they are among the few that can afford to pay for more, they 
are forced to give up any subsequent children.117 Second, the policy 
makes any domestic adoption system effectively impossible. Because 
all Chinese couples are limited to one child, the overwhelming 
majority of couples, aside from those who are unable to have 
children, will choose to have their own baby rather than adopt.118 
Finally, cultural ideas about gender have led to a surplus of 
abandoned baby girls.119 A higher value has traditionally been placed 
on sons than on daughters.120 While this archaic belief has begun to 
change, it still prevails, particularly in rural China where the majority 
of the population lives.121 As a result, many families give up 
daughters (even firstborns) so that they can try for a son.122 This leads 
to a disproportionate number of girls in orphanages and to a general 
 
115. Although China began to formally allow international adoptions in 1992, 
the practice was suspended later that year for 10 months as a result of corruption 
within the system. Chris Yeung, New Agency to Monitor Child Adoption, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Feb. 14, 1994, at 7. International adoption in China has continued 
uninterrupted since this ban was lifted. Id. 
116. United States Department of State, Office of Children’s Issues, 
Intercountry Adoption: China—Country Information, 
http://adoption.state.gov/country/china.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter 
Adoptions from China to the United States] (indicating that over 54,000 children 
have been adopted from China by U.S. families in the last ten years); Chart: Total 
Adoptions to the United States (by country), supra note 20 (showing that China has 
been the nation with the most adoptions to the U.S. for four out of the last five 
years). 
117. Olesen, supra note 28. 
118. Nili Luo, Intercountry Adoption and China: Emerging Questions and 
Developing Chinese Perspectives, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 597, 610–11 (2004). In 1999, 
China revised its adoption law to say that a family’s one child quota would not be 
effected by any children they might adopt; only their biological child. Id. at 610–
13. While this is a step in the right direction, the law has a gaping loophole: it 
applies only to children who passed through the social welfare system. Id. Any 
other children adopted by a Chinese couple counts as that couple’s ―one-child.‖ Id.  
119. Olesen, supra note 28. 
120. Bagley, supra note 111, at 188–89 (explaining that many people still 
subscribe to old beliefs that favor male children in order to ensure that parents 
receive better support in their old-age and the carrying on of the family name). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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increase in the number of children in need of adoption. It is bad 
enough that families are forced to give up any children following 
their first, but the problem severely worsens if couples keep 
abandoning their babies in order to get the one that they want. What 
if a couple has two, three, five, or more girls before they have a boy? 
They will ultimately relinquish many more children in this pursuit 
than if they had kept their first child and had to give up more only in 
the event of a subsequent unplanned pregnancy.  
This policy and its effects directly conflict with the principles of 
the Convention. While the strong cultural attachment of the Chinese 
to bloodlines falls within the Convention’s first choice scenario—that 
is, that a child be raised within his or her birth family—the laws 
enacted by the government that place a limit on children make this 
goal next to impossible to achieve. The Convention’s second-best 
option, domestic adoption, is difficult for the reasons already 
mentioned. Additionally, it may be unacceptable to some as a result 
of their affinity for blood relations in families.123 Short of 
institutionalization, international adoption becomes the only choice. 
The Convention obviously recognizes such adoption as a viable 
option,124 but reliance on it to such an extent is contrary to the 
Convention’s goal of keeping children at least within their country of 
origin. 
B. China’s New, More Restrictive Adoption Laws May Reduce 
Foreign Adoptions Without Encouraging Domestic Adoptions  
On May 1, 2007, the China Center for Adoption Affairs enacted a 
law that set strict guidelines for perspective adoptive parents.125 The 
law includes age and income restrictions as well as a requirement that 
each child be adopted by a heterosexual married couple.126 It also 
restricts people with certain ―health‖ conditions including AIDS, 
mental disability, blindness in either eye, severe facial deformation or 
a body mass index of forty or more.127 As a result, the number of 
 
123. Luo, supra note 118 at 613–14.  
124. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1. 
125. Adoptions from China to the United States, supra note 116. 
126. Id. The law requires that both parents be thirty to fifty years old (thirty to 
fifty-five if they are adopting a disabled child) and that they have a collective 
annual income of at least $80,000. Id. In addition, it requires couples to be married 
for two years (five years if either has been previously divorced) and does not allow 
more than two divorces in the couple’s past. Id.  
127. Id. 
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Chinese adoptions in the U.S. has dropped from 6,492 in 2006 to 
5,453 in 2007 to 3,911 in 2008, and finally, to 3,001 in 2009.128 The 
law is still very new, but it is already having an effect on Chinese 
adoption. Every abandoned child that is not adopted is 
institutionalized. While it is true that China has the autonomy under 
the Convention to determine if particular prospective parents are 
―suitable,‖129 one could make the argument that this new law restricts 
many couples that would be deemed suitable under the Convention’s 
interpretation of that word. By preventing these people from 
adopting, the Chinese government is allowing some children to be 
put in an institution rather than be placed with a family, which is 
against the priorities established by the Convention.130   
VI. INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT TO AMELIORATE DEFICIENCIES OF 
THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
While it is impossible to address all of the problems within the 
international adoption system, especially all at once, an overarching 
UN international central authority to supervise each of the individual 
Central Authorities could go a long way in alleviating some of these 
issues. The Convention was the first of its kind and was intended to 
create at least a foundation for cooperative international adoption 
law.131 It is hard to imagine how any new set of laws will apply in real 
world situations, but now that so many counties have implemented or 
attempted to implement the Convention’s principles, the gaps and 
problems within these mandates are more apparent.  
Romania and Cambodia are just two examples of an unfortunate 
trend: countries ending their adoption programs because they cannot 
reform them to meet the Convention’s standards.132 These 
moratoriums are not an acceptable solution; they hurt the children in 
these countries more than anyone else,133 which is in direct opposition 
to the Convention’s principle that one act ―in the best interest of the 
child.‖134 If there were a UN appointed body to oversee this, it could 
look at the individual problems within each of these struggling 
countries and work with them to devise a plan that would be feasible 
 
128. Chart: Total Adoptions to the United States (by country), supra note 20. 
129. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1141. 
130. Id. at 1134–35. 
131. BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 150. 
132. See supra Part IV.A. 
133. See supra Part IV.A. 
134. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1139–40. 
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within their individual frameworks. Similarly, this body could 
address the ambiguity of the Convention.135 Rather than waiting for a 
new Convention to convene on this issue, which may not happen in 
the near future, the UN body would be in charge of interpreting and 
construing the language of the Convention. This would provide all 
countries with one clear, uniform standard on which to base the 
respective systems.136 Lastly, rather than leave the enforcement of the 
Convention to each individual country, this solution would allow for 
a more impartial implementation of the law.137 Not only would the 
UN body make sure that the Convention is being applied correctly, it 
would also exact an appropriate penalty on countries whose 
international adoption systems do not meet the UN’s requirements.  
In attempting to put the Convention’s central principles into 
practice most effectively, one must be optimistic but also realistic as 
to what can be done. While a UN-appointed authoritative body would 
be a step in the right direction, there is only so much it could do to 
eradicate the problems in international adoption. Powerful countries 
like China, whose policies create more abandoned children and fewer 
adoptive parents, are extremely unlikely to reform their laws to bring 
them in line with the Convention’s standards. This is especially true 
of the one-child policy, which has been ingrained in the Chinese legal 
system for almost thirty years.138 In countries where the government 
genuinely wants to reform international adoption, however, the 
addition of a new authoritative body could make a significant 
difference. The same could be said for countries that did not actively 
enact laws contrary to the Convention’s principles but which 
nonetheless violate its mandates. An international body put in place 
to oversee the individual Central Authorities would go a long way in 
making the Convention’s abstract policies more of a reality.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
The greatest achievement of the 1993 Hague Convention is that it 
indentified and brought attention to the problems within the 
international adoption system. Unfortunately, it also brought along 
problems of its own.139 The Convention fails to provide support for 
 
135. See supra Part IV.B. 
136. See supra Part IV.B. 
137. See supra Part IV.C. 
138. See supra note 110.  
139. See supra Part IV. 
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countries that lack the infrastructure to reform their adoption systems 
and to create a Central Authority;140 it lacks clear, specific 
guidelines;141 and it contains no effective enforcement strategies or 
sanctions to ensure compliance.142 Perhaps most troublesome is the 
fact that certain countries, such as China, enact measures that are in 
direct opposition to the Convention’s goals.143 One way to address 
these issues would be to create a central authoritative body to oversee 
each adoption system, help countries struggling to reform, and 
penalize countries that refuse to comply with the Convention’s 
standards.144 The 1993 Hague Convention is the first treaty of its kind 
to both address international adoption specifically and endorse it as a 
preferred alternative to institutionalization.145 The international 
community must do all it can to ensure that those countries that 
engage in international adoption maintain it as an institution worthy 
of such an endorsement. 
 
140. See supra Part IV.A. 
141. See supra Part IV.B. 
142. See supra Part IV.C. 
143. See supra Part V. 
144. See supra Part VI. 
145. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1134–35. 
